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More specifically, in the NT, mentions of the Sabbath often revolve
around what is lawful or not to do on it, not whether it is still binding or
not. While Jesus and the disciples are accused of breaking the Sabbath by
their opponents (Matt 12:2; Mark 3:2, 6; Luke 13:14), neither Jesus nor
the disciples are portrayed as annulling the Sabbath. Jesus and his disciples
only challenge their audiences on what is acceptable to do during that day
(Matt 12:1, 3–5; Mark 3:4; Luke 13:15–17; 14:1–6; John 7:21–24; 9:14–16)
and who has authority to determine that acceptable behavior (Matt 12:6–8;
John 5:8–11, 16–18). The Gospels also indicate that Jesus (and at times his
disciples) had the custom of going to synagogue and resting (Mark 1:21; 6:2;
Luke 4:16; 13:10; 23:56) or teaching on the Sabbath (Luke 4:31). Jesus is
also portrayed as resting on the Sabbath in his death (Matt 28:1; John 19:31).
Matthew further portrays Jesus as considering the Sabbath an important law
for the future, after the conclusion of his earthly ministry (Matt 24:20). The
book of Acts, which describes events that took place many years after the
crucifixion of Jesus, also portrays Paul as keeping the Sabbath while attending
synagogue (13:14, 42–44; 18:4) and seeking places for prayer (16:13). Teaching at synagogue on the Sabbath is stated as Paul’s custom as well (17:2). For
a challenging Sabbath text, see Ron du Preez, Judging the Sabbath: Discovering What Can’t Be Found in Colossians 2:16 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Press, 2008). Lawrence Geraty lays out a summary of the history of
the Sabbath in the first centuries of Christianity in “From Sabbath to Sunday:
Why and When?” (Partings: How Judaism and Christianity Became One, 266).
In this article, he clarifies that the first reference to Christian Sunday found
in literary sources is in the Epistle of Barnabas, dated to the second century.
According to Geraty, this change occurred because Christians wanted to
differentiate themselves from Jews to escape Hadrian’s persecution.
The book is worth the time and investment for those interested in historical fiction or for those beginning to learn about the Greco-Roman world.
The sidebars are a good source of knowledge. They are all very concise and
informative. The first chapters of the book where the plot is being built were
not very engaging to me. However, after Priscilla and Paul are introduced in
the narrative, I could not put the book down, and when I finished reading, I
was sad that I would no longer spend time with them.
Berrien Springs, Michigan

Carina O. Prestes

De Mesel, Benjamin. The Later Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. Nordic
Wittgenstein Studies 4. Heidelberg: Springer, 2018. xiv + 186 pp. Hardcover. EUR 88.19.
De Mesel’s The Later Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy is a collection of
essays originally published independently as journal articles, but now orga-
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nized into one volume. The overall argument is that the thinking of the later
Wittgenstein, particularly the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations, can
be fruitfully applied to moral philosophy. The first chapters especially are
close readings and discussions of the late Wittgenstein and his relevance for
moral philosophy. In the latter part of the book, De Mesel then moves on to
personal reflections on issues within moral philosophy, trying to show how
the late Wittgenstein is helpful for these reflections.
I want to credit De Mesel from the outset for providing a succinct and
clear text, giving good summaries of his main points both at the beginning
and end of his arguments, in case you as a reader were lost somewhere along
the way. The clarity compensates for the leaps in themes that we find between
the various chapters, so it remains clear what he is attempting to demonstrate
at any given point.
For readers not familiar with Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), it can
be said that he is reckoned by many as one of the major philosophers in
the twentieth century. His two major works are Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(1921) and Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously in 1953).
Each represents a different strand in philosophy. In TLP, Wittgenstein wanted
to show what can be said in propositions about reality and the logical limits
of what can only be shown. In PI, he rejected much in his early thinking,
and claimed that philosophical problems arise when language is forced
into metaphysics. The task is, therefore, to bring “words back from their
metaphysical to their everyday use” (PI §116).
Wittgenstein’s views on religion and ethics have been much debated,
and his oft enigmatic formulations can usually be read in different directions.
The interest in his religious and ethical views is fueled by the impression
many receive that he himself was a deeply religious and ethically committed
person. It is difficult, however, to point to one or two statements and say
“this is how Wittgenstein thought about X.” His statements need to be read
in light of the oeuvre of the rest of his writings. To decipher Wittgenstein’s
views, we need to look not only at what he says about moral issues, but just
as much how he says it, in line with the thinking explicated in PI. And it
is particularly here that De Mesel’s book is helpful. Through a close and
cautious reading, he performs a modest reading of the late Wittgenstein. To
me, he also makes a compelling case for how to apply the late Wittgenstein
in moral philosophy.
I do not intend here to enter technical questions about the validity of De
Mesel’s readings of the late Wittgenstein. Instead, I would like to briefly reflect
on some lessons to be drawn from the book that may be of value to AUSS
readers. In chapter one, De Mesel begins by acknowledging the challenge in
drawing the late Wittgenstein into moral philosophy. Wittgenstein’s explicit
statements on ethics are scarce and dense. It appears to be a wise move not to
try to develop a moral philosophy out of the little we have, but rather use the
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writings of the late Wittgenstein as a “toolbox” to interpret and understand
his ethical statements.
In chapter two, like Wittgenstein, De Mesel tries to show that what is
often taken as the same is really different. Wittgenstein’s analogy between
philosophical methods and therapies (PI §133) has often been misunderstood. De Mesel shows that it would not be legitimate to understand
Wittgenstein’s analogy to imply that philosophers are ill, that philosophical
questions are illnesses, that only philosophers are patients of philosophical
therapies, that all philosophers are therapists, that Wittgenstein’s therapies are
necessarily psychological therapies, nor that their ideal of health is the end of
philosophy. From this exercise, we learn to be cautious in confusing analogies
and identifications. How often the metaphors and analogies we use to explain
a phenomenon come to occupy our thinking and become the reality of our
thinking. To the extent that our thinking determines our form of living, it is a
reminder of the necessity of a constant revision of possible logical fallacies in
our ethical reflections. As biblical scholars, it also cautions us against taking
biblical metaphors and analogies as a substitute for the truth it speaks to. But
it also questions what misunderstandings constantly lurk in our philosophical, theological, and ethical thinking, misunderstandings emerging from us
and which remove words out of their everyday or biblical usage to foreign
soil—be that theoretical or metaphysical.
De Mesel opens chapter three by claiming that “according to the later
Wittgenstein, philosophy is not about advancing theses. Rather, it is an openended set of therapeutic methods for making philosophical problems disappear” (49–50). Central to this method is providing ‘surveyable representations.’ These should remedy our lack of overview of the use of our words and
expressions and “produce a kind of understanding which consists in seeing
connections” that “contribute to dissolving philosophical problems engendered by our misunderstanding of the workings of our language” (55). De
Mesel then outlines four techniques used by Wittgenstein in his ‘surveyable
representations’: (1) provide explicit statements of grammatical rules; (2) give
examples of our actual use of words; (3) through fictitious language-games
Wittgenstein invites us to ‘suppose,’ ‘think of,’ or ‘imagine’ ways in which
words can and cannot be used meaningfully; and (4) “words or sentences
are compared to others by way of analogies or similes” (56). De Mesel then
shows that Wittgenstein’s 1929 “Lecture on Ethics,” a lecture often seen as a
transitional work between TLP and IP, can be seen as providing a ‘surveyable
representation’ within ethics, by investigating our actual use of ethical words
like ‘good,’ in inviting us to imagine situations to clarify how words can and
cannot be used, and in proceeding by way of analogies and similes. In the
debate on how to understand the “Lecture on Ethics,” De Mesel proposes
that we see it as an example of how to go about dealing with ethical questions,
more than providing a stance on concrete ethical issues. To me, this is a
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reading that makes more sense than the debates on how to understand the
exact ethical position promoted in the lecture. Further, it becomes a reminder
to pay close attention to how words are actually used in life, and also in the
biblical text. James Barr’s The Semantics of Biblical Language (1961), written
at about the same time as Wittgenstein’s PI, has taught us the importance of
close attention to the context and usage of biblical words. Even with the value
of valency studies and dictionaries, Wittgenstein and De Mesel remind us
that this will be a continuous process.
De Mesel then renders a critique of those scholars who claim that a
Wittgensteinian approach does not leave ethics with a particular subject
matter (ch. 4). According to De Mesel, Wittgenstein does not exclude the
possibility of meta-ethics and a particular subject matter of moral philosophy. Chapter five is a reply to Brandhorst, wherein De Mesel argues for the
possibility of objectivity in ethics according to Wittgenstein. In chapter six,
he argues that a better analogy to the concept of moral perception may be
seeing emotions rather than seeing color, as defenders of the concept of moral
perception have tended to argue.
In chapter seven, De Mesel argues that moral questions often ask for
different kinds of answers than what non-moral questions do. Often moral
questions have been answered by theologians and philosophers with narrow
answers. According to De Mesel, a moral question has five characteristics:
one, it is typically raised in a personal relation with a shared history; two,
it asks for serious consideration, engagement, commitment, and interest;
three, it asks for an answer recognizing its delicacy; four, it asks for an answer
offering a deeper understanding; and, five, it asks for an answer recognizing
that the inquirer’s decision is non-accidental and inescapably his/hers (145).
While philosophers, theologians, ethicists, and pastors may constantly be
tempted to give narrow answers to moral questions, this chapter reminds us
of the importance of understanding how a moral and non-moral question
may differ. A moral question may ask for much more than is expected of an
amoral question. In reading this chapter, I was constantly reminded of how
Jesus often answers a question with a new question. It appears that it is not
always the answer that is the most important, but what happens in us in the
process of reflection.
Chapter eight reflects on four ways in which morality can be absent
from moral arguments: first, the argument denies moral certainty; second,
the argument displays no participant attitude; third, it offers no deepened
understanding; and, fourth, it ignores the personal character of moral
problems. Knowledge without wisdom, objective observation without
participation, ethics without an ethical form of life—maybe here is the key
to why Wittgenstein was so reserved in speaking about religion and ethics.
For him, it was not something primarily to be talked of, but something
essentially to be lived.
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I want to thank De Mesel for an appealing reflection on and clear communication of a way to bring the late Wittgenstein into moral philosophy. In
addition, I appreciated just as much his succinct articulations of Wittgenstein’s
call to a work on oneself. As philosophers, theologians, ethicists, and pastors
we need to dissolve many of the problems our logical fallacies have created, in
order to be able to relate to the real things of life and living.
Vesterålen, Norway

Kenneth Bergland

Crawford, Sidnie White. Scribes and Scrolls at Qumran. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2019. ix + 400 pp. Hardcover. USD 50.00.
In her new book on the Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS), Sidnie W. Crawford argues
that the scrolls of the Qumran caves were part of a sectarian library of the
Essenes. For those familiar with the DSS scholarship, the claim is not original
and is accepted by the leading scholars in the area. It has been proposed from
the very beginning of Qumran studies, as Crawford points out, for the simple
fact of this being the easiest explanation to account for all the data (ch. 1).
But not everyone agrees with this theory, and even those who do still disagree
about the details of tentative reconstructions of the origins of the scrolls in
the caves. Thus, Crawford’s book is the latest effort to consolidate this theory
which connects the scrolls, the archaeology of the caves, and the buildings
in Qumran with the Essenes. Although others have written on Qumran as
a library (e.g., Stegemann and Cross), none of the approaches deal with the
subject in the manner Crawford does. What she brings to the table is an upto-date synthesis of the archaeology of both the caves and the compound from
the perspective of the composition of a library in antiquity. She also writes
from a vantage point of having all the DSS manuscripts available, besides the
new material findings and scientific examination of the known artifacts from
the pertinent sites. For this reason, her book immediately becomes a reference point. Her evaluation, in my opinion, is judicious and carefully detailed.
Crawford persuasively summarizes and evaluates the main arguments of the
debate. For the scholars of DSS who already accept the Essene hypothesis,
this is a welcome study. And to those against the theory, this is a major work
that needs to be reckoned with in any future research on the matter.
The book is divided into three sections. In part one, Sidnie lays out
the work of scribes and the characteristics of libraries in the ancient world.
In part two, she evaluates the archaeology of the Qumran caves and the
building compound, arguing for the existence of scribal activity. And in the
final section, she reflects on the major findings as far as they relate to the
possibility of Qumran being a scribal center. So, what are the major facts that
support her hypothesis? From part one she aptly demonstrates that libraries in
antiquity were mostly the work of scribal elite, who were experts in different

